BSides Talk: It’s 2020, so why am I still able to read your pager traffic?

At the BSides OK 2020 virtual conference Cameron Mac Millan recently presented a talk titled "It’s 2020, so why am I still able to read your pager traffic?". On this blog we have posted numerous times about privacy breaches stemming from insecure wireless pager traffic. Anyone with a radio or SDR can receive and decode pager messages, and this has been known and done since the 1980's. Cameron's talk explains how paging systems work, who are the modern users of pagers, how to capture and decode pager messages and how to best log and filter through messages. He goes on to describe a number of major pager security breaches that he's personally seen. The talk preview reads:

This talk explores why pagers remain a potential threat vector in many environments despite the technology being 40 years old. This is not a the-sky-is-falling presentation: everything from paging history to how simple it is to decode pager traffic (and the associated risks) is covered without FUD.

I enjoy poking things with sticks and turn over rocks to see what crawls out from under them. One of my interests is seeing how technologies believed to be obsolete can still pose a problem for security today, and do that from the perspective of a 20-year career in infosec. When not creating tomorrow’s problems with yesterday’s technology, I can usually be found wrenching on unusual cars.

It’s 2020, so why am I still able to read your pager traffic? - Cameron Mac Millan - BSidesOK 2020

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Eavesdropping on LTE Calls with a USRP Software Defined Radio

Ars Technica recently ran a story about how University researchers have been able to eavesdrop on LTE mobile phone calls using a USRP B210 software defined radio which runs the Airscope software. The technique exploits a flaw in how some LTE carriers are implementing their keystream. A keystream is a stream of random data combined with the actual voice data, resulting in encrypted data.

It turns out that many LTE carriers reuse the same keystream when two calls are made within a single radio connection. An attacker can then record an encrypted conversation, then immediately call the victim after that conversation. The attacker can now access the encrypted keystream, and as the keystream is identical to the first conversation, the first conversation can now be decoded. 

The Ars Technica article, the original paper and a website created about the ReVoLTE technique and software go into detail about how the attack works. On the website the team explain the attack in simple terms:

The ReVoLTE attacks exploit the reuse of the same keystream for two subsequent calls within one radio connection. This weakness is caused by an implementation flaw of the base station (eNodeB). In order to determine how widespread the security gap was, we tested a number of randomly selected radio cells mainly across Germany but also other countries. The security gap affected 12 out of 15 base stations.

The ReVoLTE attack aims to eavesdrop the call between Alice and Bob. We will name this call the target or first call. To perform the attack, the attacker sniffs the encrypted radio traffic of Alice within the cell of a vulnerable base station. Shortly after the first call ends, the attacker calls Alice and engages her in a conversation. We name this second call, or keystream call. For this call, the attacker sniffs the encrypted radio traffic of Alice and records the unencrypted sound (known plaintext).

For decrypting the target call, the attacker must now compute the following: First, the attacker xors the known plaintext (recorded at the attacker's phone) with the ciphertext of the keystream call. Thus, the attacker computes the keystream of the keystream call. Due to the vulnerable base station, this keystream is the same as for the target (first) call. In a second step, the attacker decrypts the first call by xoring the keystream with the first call's ciphertext. It is important to note that the attacker has to engage the victim in a longer conversation. The longer he/she talked to the victim, the more content of the previous communication he/she can decrypt. For example, if the attacker and victim spoke for five minutes, the attacker could later decode five minutes of the previous conversation.

The ReVoLTE Attack
Demonstration of the ReVoLTE attack in a commerical LTE network.

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DragonOS: Installing Crocodile Hunter For Detecting Fake 4G Cell Sites

A few days ago we posted about two SDR related DEFCON talks which were recently released. One of the talks was about detecting fake 4G base stations with a bladeRF SDR and a tool they created called "Crocodile Hunter". It is currently compatible with the bladeRF x40 and USRP B200. The talk summary is posted below as it nicely summarizes what fake 4G base stations are and what Crocodile Hunter can do.

4G based IMSI catchers such as the Hailstorm are becoming more popular with governments and law enforcement around the world, as well as spies, and even criminals. Until now IMSI catcher detection has focused on 2G IMSI catchers such as the Stingray which are quickly falling out of favor.

In this talk we will tell you how 4G IMSI Catchers might work to the best of our knowledge, and what they can and can't do. We demonstrate a brand new software project to detect fake 4G base stations, with open source software and relatively cheap hardware. And finally we will present a comprehensive plan to dramatically limit the capabilities of IMSI catchers (with the long term goal of making them useless once and for all).

The Crocodile Hunter software is apparently a little difficult to install and get running, so Aaron who runs DragonOS YouTube tutorial channel has uploaded a video documenting how to install and configure the software. The tutorial assumes that you are the running the latest DragonOS image which already includes a lot of the prerequisite software, and in his example he uses a USRP B205mini-i SDR.

DragonOS DEF CON 28 Crocodile Hunter Setup (DragonOS LTS PublicR4, srsLTE, USRP B205mini-i)

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TechMinds: OpenWebRX Feature Overview And Raspberry Pi Setup

Over on YouTube TechMinds has posted his latest video which shows an overview of the features available in OpenWebRX, and also how to set it up on a Raspberry Pi. OpenWebRX is software which allows you to access your SDR remotely via the internet or local network through a web browser. All major SDRs are supported including RTL-SDRs. The software includes a waterfall display, all the standard demodulators, as well as several digital decoders for DMR, YSF, NXDN, D-Star, POCSAG, APRS, FT8, FT4, WSPR, JT65 and JT9.

In the video TechMinds first demonstrates OpenWebRX in action, showing reception of HF SSB amateur radio signals, decoding FT8 and plotting received grids on a map, decoding and plotting APRS on a map and decoding YSF/DSTAR/DMR digital voice. After this demonstration he goes on to show how to set up the OpenWebRX server on a Raspberry Pi via the installation image.

OpenWebRX Feature Overview And Raspberry Pi Setup

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Sanchez: Create False Colour Images from GOES/Himawari/GK-2A Infrared

With an RTL-SDR, an appropriate satellite antenna and LNA it is possible to receive visible light images from geostationary satellites such as GOES/Himawari and GK-2A. However, in a 24 hour cycle there will only be one or two images that show the Earth fully illuminated by the sun. The rest of the day parts or all of the Earth will be dark with not even clouds visible. To get around this the satellites also use an Infrared (IR) camera which can see clouds at all times. However, these images are greyscale and not very visually appealing.

To fix this aesthetic issue there is now a recently released multiplatform tool called "Sanchez" which will combine a high resolution underlay image with the greyscale IR image in order to create a more beautiful image. The software is command line based and can run on a batch of collected images.

False colour satellite images made by Sanchez
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Testing the Electrosense Up/Downconverter Expansion Board For 0 – 6 GHz

The Electrosense network is an open source project aiming to deploy radio spectrum sensors worldwide. The idea is to help analyze and understand radio spectrum usage across the globe. Each sensor consists of an RTL-SDR, Raspberry Pi and an optional downconverter to receive the higher bands. If you're interested we wrote an overview of the project in a previous post. 

Recently we received a sample of their Up/Downconverter expansion board which is used to expand the frequency range of the RTL-SDR to 0 MHz to 6 GHz. The converter board is entirely open source with the design files available on GitHub. The team note that they are also working on a V2 version which will be cheaper and smaller. The schematic and Firmware for the V2 is also available right now, but it is still under early testing and may change.

The board is not for sale, however you can apply to be considered for a free unit if you want to host your own Electrosense node and meet their criteria. If you do not you can still produce the board yourself. The team mention that the design is easily hand soldered, but there are a few difficult LGA components like the PLL, crystals and mixer which require a heat gun to solder. A the same time they also note that it is possible to get PCB manufacture and SMT assembly done for you for dirt cheap by PCB prototype companies like JLC PCB. 

The Expansion Up/Downconverter Board

The converter board has 4-input SMA ports (only 3 are used) and one output port which connects to the RTL-SDR. The first input port is for the HF antenna input. This input connects to the circuit which converts 0 - 30 MHz into a higher frequency which can be received by the RTL-SDR. The second port is simply a pass through for the standard 24 MHz - 1.766 GHz range of a normal SDR. The third port is unused, and the fourth port connects the antenna to the downconverter circuit which allows us to receive from 1.766 GHz to 6 GHz.

The Electrosense Converter Board

Continue reading →

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MySondy: Radiosonde Tracking Firmware for a TTGO ESP32 LORA Board

A radiosonde is a small sensor and radio package normally attached to a weather balloon. Meteorological agencies around the world typically launch two balloons a day from several locations to gather data for weather prediction. We have featured radiosondes several times on this blog as it is easy to use an RTL-SDR and computer to receive and decode their signals, which can used to hunt down the fallen sonde, or to receive the weather telemetry data.

Recently RTL-SDR.COM reader António submitted a link to an interesting project called "MySondy" which is created by Mirko Dalmonte (IZ4PNN). MySondy is custom firmware for TTGO Lora32 433 MHz boards which allows them to be turned into a radiosonde tracker. A TTGO is a cheap ~US$20 LoRa32 IoT dev board with an onboard WiFi + Bluetooth enabled ESP32 microcontroller and OLED display. Some of the slightly higher priced units come with a built in GPS receiver as well. With the custom firmware it is capable of receiving and decoding common radiosonde protocols such as RS41, M10, RS92 and DFM.

A TTGO ESP32 LoRa Board
A TTGO running MySondy firmware enclosed in a 3D Printed Case

There is also an Android App called MySondy Go and MySondy FINDER which connect to the TTGO via Bluetooth. This app plots the location of the radiosonde on a map, allowing you to easily follow and track down the balloon. You can also go to mysondy.altervista.org to see public MySondy stations. Clicking on a blinking dot will connect you with the MySondy server, allowing you to see tracked sondes.

MySondy Web Interface

The firmware and software appear to be fairly new, so there isn't much information about this that we could find just yet. Also we note that all manuals and information about the project is written in Italian, except for a French magazine article (pdf) that António sent us to upload.

We note that these TTGO ESP32 LoRa boards are quite interesting by themselves, with other custom firmware available to do things like create a Paxcounter which counts the number of mobile devices in an area via WiFi and Bluetooth signals, and the ability to use them as a GPS enabled Mesh network based text message radio.

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Defcon 2020 Online Talks: Satellite Eavesdropping & Detecting Fake 4G Base Stations

DEFCON 2020 was held online this year in and the talks were released a few days ago on their website and on YouTube. If you weren't already aware Defcon is a major yearly conference all about information security, and some of the talks deal with wireless and SDR topics. We found two very interesting SDR and wireless related talks that we have highlighted below. The first talk investigates using commercial satellite TV receivers to eavesdrop on satellite internet communications. The second discusses using a bladeRF or USRP to detect fake 4G cellphone basestations. Slides for these talks are available on the Defcon Media server under the presentations folder.

DEF CON Safe Mode - James Pavur - Whispers Among the Stars

Space is changing. The number of satellites in orbit will increase from around 2,000 today to more than 15,000 by 2030. This briefing provides a practical look at the considerations an attacker may take when targeting satellite broadband communications networks. Using $300 of widely available home television equipment I show that it is possible to intercept deeply sensitive data transmitted on satellite links by some of the world's largest organizations.

The talk follows a series of case studies looking at satellite communications affecting three domains: air, land, and sea. From home satellite broadband customers, to wind farms, to oil tankers and aircraft, I show how satellite eavesdroppers can threaten privacy and communications security. Beyond eavesdropping, I also discuss how, under certain conditions, this inexpensive hardware can be used to hijack active sessions over the satellite link.

The talk concludes by presenting new open source tools we have developed to help researchers seeking to improve satellite communications security and individual satellite customers looking to encrypt their traffic.

The talk assumes no background in satellite communications or cryptography but will be most interesting to researchers interested in tackling further unsolved security challenges in outer space.

DEF CON Safe Mode - James Pavur - Whispers Among the Stars

DEF CON Safe Mode - Cooper Quintin - Detecting Fake 4G Base Stations in Real Time

4G based IMSI catchers such as the Hailstorm are becoming more popular with governments and law enforcement around the world, as well as spies, and even criminals. Until now IMSI catcher detection has focused on 2G IMSI catchers such as the Stingray which are quickly falling out of favor.

In this talk we will tell you how 4G IMSI Catchers might work to the best of our knowledge, and what they can and can't do. We demonstrate a brand new software project to detect fake 4G base stations, with open source software and relatively cheap hardware. And finally we will present a comprehensive plan to dramatically limit the capabilities of IMSI catchers (with the long term goal of making them useless once and for all).

GitHub: https://github.com/EFForg/crocodilehunter

DEF CON Safe Mode - Cooper Quintin - Detecting Fake 4G Base Stations in Real Time

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